THE VERDICT OF ’63.
The only victories obtained by the Confederate party of the North during the progress of the war were secured by surprise and deception, at a time when the public mind was depressed by defeat. In 1862 the managers of the concern who, through their favorite Generals, McClellan and Buell, had contrived to obscure with disaster the brilliant exploits of Grant and Farragut, found the people gloomy and discontented, casting the blame of Copperhead military failures upon the President, doubtful of the effect of the emancipation policy, and fearful cf the ultimate success of the rebellion. The true men of the loyal Stales, intent upon making war, had freely furnished volunteers ; and those who remained at home, little suspecting the prevalence of political sympathy with treason in their midst, had neglected to organize and separate the sheep from the goats. Under these favoring circumstances, the Confederate leaders, who had quietly organized their forces, came forward to advocate a more vigorous prosecution of the war and to play the part of indignant patriots, who were simply disgusted by the interference of the Administration with “our only General’s military place. Upon such pretenses they elected Governors in New York and New Jersey, and gave some of the most patriotic States in the Union Congressional delegations, which, as was subsequently shown, were ready to sell out the country to Jeff. Davis for a mere song. Lord Lyons, the British Minister, has put on record the confession made to him by some of these men that they were playing a game of deception and were opposed to any attempt to interfere with Jeff. Davis by force of arms. But to the honor of the people and the confusion of all disloyal calculations in the present campaign, be it noted, that these high-minded and patriotic politicians have never since gained a victory in any State, except in New Jersey, and even there the Unionists gained six thousand votes in 1863, and would have obtained a majority if the soldiers had been allowed to vote. No sooner had the Copperheads betrayed their real aim and begun to show the alliance between them and the rebels in arms, than they fell under the popular ban. If the Congressional elections had occurred in the Fall of ’83, there would not have been over twenty-five of these attorneys for Jeff. Davis left to disgrace the National Councils. In the presence of active, organized loyalty, and with their traitorous record branded upon their brows, they had as little chance of success as so many delegates, regularly commissioned by Confederate authorities, would have had in the North.
McClellan’s doom was written in 1863. Everybody knew then that he had cast his lot with the Copperheads and would be the candidate of that party for the Presidency. The character of his political associations left no intelligent citizen in doubt as to his course ; but to settle the question beyond all controversy he wrote a letter, upon the eve of the election in Pennsylvania, indorsing the views of Judge Woodward, the disloyal candidate for Governor. Did the name of “our only General” increase the popularity of the party? Was not McClellan’s party defeated in every State, except New Jersey ? Was not the verdict of the people overwhelmingly in favor of the President, notwithstanding McClellan’s championship of the opposition ? Has anything occurred since to sweeten the odor of the party or to raise McClellan in public esteem as a soldier, statesman or patriot ?
As for the party, it has been more persistent and shameless during the past year in planting itself upon the rebel platform, and conspiring against the public peace, than at any former period. As for the candidate, the victories of real soldiers have exploded the bubble of reputation which had been blown for him ; the wholesome effect of war measures which he disapproved has deprived him of the pretense of statesmanship, and the acceptance of the Chicago platform has drawn the gravest suspicions upon his professions of fidelity to the cause of tbe Government. Is the public mind depressed with defeat or buoyant over victory ? Are the loyalists idle, unorganized, or distracted by dissension? The people know that the tremendous fighting of this campaign has drained the life-blood of the rebellion, and have, besides, the strong assurance of rebel journals and rebel orators that the hope of a Copperhead success in the North alone enables the enemy to present a hostile and determined front to the forces of the Government. The loyalists were never better organized, more active or more sternly resolved to move in solid phalanx upon the enemj’s works and carry the old flag to victory. There is no gleam of hope in the political or military situation that George B. McClellan and his traitorous associates will be able to reverse the judgment given against them in 1868. The General is on his way through the swamp, under a lively impression that the enemy number just about three to one, and this time he is not mistaken in his estimate of the force in front. The people intend to reap “the benefit of our many victories,” but under the leaders by whom those victories were won.